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There is widespread agreement that most developing
countries urgently need massive investments in infra-
structure. Until relatively recently, the provision of  in-
frastructure services was generally considered the
responsability of the public sector.  Chronic budget-
ary problems and widespread  disappointment with
the performance of state-owned enterprises, however,
have led to a wave of privatizations of infrastructur
throughtout the world.
Privatization has several advantages.  First, the public
sector often lacks the financial and human resources
necessary to undertake needed projects. Second, pri-
vate firms are usually better run and more efficient than
state-owned firms. Third, private participation helps
to screen projects for  “white elephants,” as firms do
not want to lose money.  And fourth, cost-based user
fees are easier to justify politically when infrastructure
providers are private.
Unfortunately, private infrastructure projects are sub-
ject to many pitfalls that must be avoided to realize
the potential advantages. One of the main difficulties
occurs when the privatized infrastructure project is a
monopoly, or worse, when the government guaran-
tees monopoly status to the privatized firm in order to
raise revenues from the privatization process (this is
the case of Peru’s long distance telephone market. Ex-
changing a public for a private monopoly can reduce
social welfare, especially if the private investors have
lobbying power.
It is well known that there are important limitations to
direct government regulation.  For example,  firms have
better information about cost and demand parameters,
regulators can observe effort only imperfectly, and
there are incentive problems within regulatory organi-
zations that limit their effectiveness. These difficulties
are more severe in developing countries, because regu-
latory agencies lack the necessary human and finan-
cial  resources to be an effective counterpart to regu-
lated firms.
With this in mind, it is possible to create a social wel-
fare ranking of the alternatives available to a govern-
ment that plans to privatize the provision of infrastruc-
ture services.  The overriding premise is  that when-
ever feasible1 competition should regulate the provi-
sion of infrastructure. However when competition can-
not work  due to the technological characteristics of
the infrastructure services (viz, tunnels and bridges),
regulators should use mechanisms that mimic compe-
tition and use direct regulation only as a last resort2.
This implies that, in principles the temporary franchis-
ing of infrastructure should be preferred to the cre-
ation of regulated utilities since the former require con-
siderably less regulatory supervision than the latter.
At present, few types of infrastructure projects are
auctioned periodically.  In some cases the reason is
fundamental.  For instances, when the quality and
maintenance status of the assets cannot be verified (as
is  the case, for example, with underground pipes in
water distribution and sewage), the periodic auction-
ing of the franchise is not feasible3.  Under these cir-
cumstances, a regulated utility is preferable, since this
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1For a list of previously regulated infrastructure services
that are now provided in competitive markets, see klein and
Smith (1994).
2Two examples that illustrate the advantages of deregu-
lation over direct regulation are the following.  First, the an-
nual benefits from deregulation in the airline, trucking, rail-
road and telecomm unication sectors in the United States
have been estimated to lie in the range of US$35-45 billion
(see Winston 1993).  Second, in Chile the long distance mo-
nopoly operator was assumed to be regulated efficiently.  Nev-
ertheless, once competition was introduced in the late 1994,
prices of international calls fell by more than 60% and de-
mand more than doubled.
3This is Williamson’s (1985) argument.  French municipal
water franchises are an exception, since they are auctioned
periodically in order to stimulate efficiency.  Yet they rarely
change hands (see Klein and Smith 1996).2
mechanism provides better incentives for investments
and maintenance.
There are other cases where experience with tempo-
rary franchises has not been satisfactory. For example,
there are many franchise projects that are so risky that
private firms refuse to participate without governments
guarantees.  The guarantees are often implicit: con-
tracts are renegotiated when the franchise holder runs
into financial trouble due to higher than anticipated
construction costs or lower than expected demand.
These renegotiations are usually to the detriment of
taxpayers and users.  Whether implicit or explicit, guar-
antees change the incentives facing prospective fran-
chise holders and their financiers. That is, they have
fewer incentives to screen projects carefully and to
monitor performance and costs. Moreover, a firm that
expects to be able to renegotiate will offer its contract
artificially low bids “lowballing.” If this happens, the
advantages of privatization disappear.  The result is
that  taxpayers and users have to pay for white el-
ephants, and inefficient firms may win the franchise
because their confidence in their renegotiating skills
allows them to underbid their competitors.
Franchise contracts in developing countries tend to
lack flexibility.  This lack of flexibility is necessary to
reduce “creeping” (or even outright) expropriation of
the franchise holder and reduce the power of corrupt
regulators to favor franchise holders at the expense of
the public.  Yet, inflexible contracts can be very long
run.  In addition, renegotiations of contract conditions
can be costly in the absence of fair compensation for
breach of the original contract. Consider the case in
which the project must be expanded or rates must be
increased for efficiency reasons.  How are the expan-
sion costs to be divided (or, even determined)? How
much of the additional income from user fees is to be
appropriated by the franchise holder? There are no
easy answers to these questions under standard fran-
chise mechanisms.
Since competition and the regulation of monopolies
have been extensively covered in the economics lit-
erature, this paper concentrates on mechanisms that
attempt to reproduce the effects of competition in the
case of monopoly franchises of infrastructure services.
Demsetz, following Chadwick (1859), has argued that
periodic open and competitive auctions for the provi-
sion of infrastructure services can reproduce the re-
sults that are obtained in competitive markets.
Williamson (1985) has criticized this approach, argu-
ing that the franchise holder will skimp on maintenance
if the state of conservation of the assets is unobserv-
able, and,  that contracts will be renegotiated ex post
facto to the detriment of the public.  This paper ana-
lyzes franchises for the provision of infrastructure, with
a particular emphasis on the mechanisms by which fran-
chises are auctioned. We argue that  many of the prob-
lems that plague temporary franchises  stem from the
standard practice of fixing the length (or term) of the
concession. Since the franchise term is independent of
actual demand franchise holders bear most of the de-
mand risk.  This is inefficient and leads to pressures
for guarantees and (eventually) contract renegotiations.
The purpose of this paper is to present a new auction
mechanism that solves many of the problems that have
hindered the use of franchises. Under least present
value of revenue (LPVR) auctions, the regulator fixes
user fees (according to some optimizing criterion) and
asks for bids on the present value of revenue from
user fees that franchise holders will accept in exchange
for building, operating and maintaining the infrastruc-
ture. The winning bid is the one that asks for the small-
est present value of revenues.  With this scheme, the
franchise ends when the present value of revenue equals
the winning bid. Year-to-year revenues are discounted
at a rate known to all bidders before the auction.  This
implies that the term of the concession is not set be-
forehand. The franchise lasts longer if  demand grows
slower than expected, and is shorter otherwise.
There are several advantages to this scheme.  First,
the flexibility of the contract length reduces the impor-
tance of making accurate demand forecasts and sub-
stantially reduces the risk borne (and the risk premium
demanded) by the franchise holder. Second, in LPVR
auctions the bid made by a firm reveals the income
required to earn a normal profit. We argue that this
reduces the scope for post-contract opportunistic re-
negotiations. It is politically more difficult for the gov-3
ernment to exploit the franchise holder by changing
the original contract, because the winning bid allows
for a clear and observable calculation of the wealth
loss borne by the franchise holder. By contrast, under
fixed-term franchises it is difficult to estimate how a
change in, say, the term of the franchise affects the
franchise holder’s profitability. Moreover, under LPVR
contracts the franchise holder faces larger difficulties
in attempting to renegotiate the contract, since any
changes in the amounts to be received can be com-
pared with the original winning bid.  As a consequence,
LPVR auctions  discourage lowballing, because it is
easier for the regulator to threaten to terminate the
franchise and pay the uncollected balance of the origi-
nal bid in the event that the franchise holder asks for a
renegotiation. An easily observable and uncontroversial
compensation does not exist in the case of fixed-term
contracts.
Third, LPVR franchises are flexible because the plan-
ner knows the fair compensation for early termination
of the contract. Consider the case where the infra-
structure project must be enlarged because demand
has grown much faster than anticipated and capacity
constraints are binding. The planner can terminate the
franchise, pay the uncollected balance and re-auction
the larger project, including perhaps the amount paid
as compensation, so that no government expenditures
are involved. By contrast, when the term of the fran-
chise is fixed, the fair compensation is the expected
value of income had the terms of the contract remained
unchanged, a number that cannot be inferred from any
accounting data. Fourth, under LPVR schemes,
changes in user fees have no effect on the revenues of
the franchise holder,4  they only affect the duration of
the franchise. Since maintenance costs are related to
use but not to the duration of the franchise, the effect
of the change in user fees on the present value of costs
and on profits is not important.  Hence, user fees can
be adapted to the changing pattern of demand, in con-
trast to fixed-term auctions, where modifications of
user fees have a direct impact on profits and require
pricing rules to be set for the duration of the franchise.
Finally, LPVR auctions provide strong incentives to
screen for the quality of the projects. Since bad
projects will not recoup costs even if the project lasts
indefinitely,  an incorrect evaluation of the project
saddles the franchise holder with losses.  As the need
for guarantees is smaller, screening incentives are stron-
ger than with fixed-term auctions where high demand
risk has led to generous government guarantees to
ensure private interest in participating in the auction.
An important limitation of LPVR auctions is that they
reduce the incentives to take measures that increase
demand for the franchise. With a fixed term auction,
the franchise holder reaps most of the benefits from
investing in demand enhancing activities, since the fran-
chise term remains the same when demand is in-
creased.  By contrast, with an LPVR auction the holder
of the franchise receives the same revenue in present
value regardless of the temporal schedule of demand,
so that the incentives to provide good service or to
market the project creatively are much diminished. In
some types of infrastructure projects this is not a seri-
ous disadvantage, since minimum quality and service
standards can be set and verified, and once they are
met, demand is not highly responsive to the marketing
efforts of the franchise holder. Important cases in which
this holds, and are thus appropriate for LPVR auc-
tions, are infrastructure projects such as roads, tun-
nels and bridges.
In cases where demand is sensitive to the actions of
the franchise holder or service standards cannot be
verified,  the scope for applying LPVR auctions can
be increased significantly by  unbundling the project
into two components,  one that captures the advan-
tages of LPVR auctions, and another that mitigates
the lack of incentives to stimulate demand. Under this
scheme, the basic infrastructure is provided under a
standard LPVR scheme, which charges a user fee
determined by the social planner. In addition, services
are provided under a fixed-term (high incentive power)
scheme based upon a maximum fee schedule or, al-
ternatively, by competitive operators of the basic in-
4So long as the new user fee is high enough to pay the
present value of revenue sought by the bidder in finite time.4
frastructure.  Under such a scheme, the high front load
investment in basic infrastructure faces the low risk
inherent in LPVR schemes,  retaining flexibility and
the capacity to screen for white elephants.  Opera-
tors, who presumably do not face the same high initial
investments, would have strong incentives to increase
demand.  Of course, the disadvantages of fixed term
auctions would remain, but the amounts at risk, the
amounts to be renegotiated and any compensation
would all be smaller, thus reducing their importance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2 we  classify infrastructure projects according to
their technological characteristics. In order to estab-
lish conditions under which franchising is feasible and
desirable. In section 3 we discuss several conceptual
issues that arise in franchising. Section 4 discusses the
shortcomings of fixed-term mechanisms. Section 5 in-
troduces and analyzes LPVR auctions. Section 6 dis-
cusses the unbundling of franchises. The authors’
conclussions are presented in the final section.5
Private participation in the provision of infrastructure
comes in one of the following three forms. First, tech-
nological characteristics may render a competitive
market possible, as with electric power generation.
Under these circumstances little intervention by the
regulator is needed beyond creating and maintaining
competitive conditions in the market. Second, firms
may compete for a franchise, as has happened with
highways in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and other coun-
tries. In this case the regulator has a more active role,
enforcing agreed tolls and quality standards. Third, the
services of the infrastructure project may be provided
by a regulated public utility.
In this section we provide a classification of techno-
logical and demand conditions that determine which
of the three schemes should be used for a particular
infrastructure service.  Our conclusion, summarized in
Figure 1, is the following: When scale economies (rela-
tive to the size of the market) are unimportant, com-
petitive conditions can and should be created; no fur-
ther regulation being required in this case. However,
when scale economies matter, two possibilities need
to be considered.  Franchising is preferred when the
quality of assets is observable at a relatively low cost.
Otherwise, a regulated public utility is preferable.
Even though the remainder of this section is of inde-
pendent interest, since we are not aware of a classifi-
cation along the lines that we present, it can be skipped
without loss of continuity. For this reason the reader
who trusts the conclusion of the preceding paragraph
may go directly to section 3.
Optimal Mechanisms for Infrastructure Provision
We start from the premise that competition should
regulate the provision of infrastructure whenever fea-
sible. If competition can work, either because a well-
developed market exists or one can be designed (for
example, as is the case with electricity generation),
private contracts should be left to deal with issues such
as renegotiation, flexibility and risk sharing. Regula-
tors should intervene in the design of contracts only
when competition cannot work. In that case, they
should use mechanisms that mimic competition as far
as possible and use direct regulation only as a last re-
sort.
There are sound reasons to avoid direct regulation. It
is now common knowledge (see, for example, Laffont
and Tirole 1993) that there are limits to regulation.
These problems stem from two facts.
First, asymmetries of information imply that regulated
firms have better information about relevant cost and
demand parameters, and that regulators can observe
effort only imperfectly. Second, there are incentive
compatibility problems within regulatory organizations
that severely limit their effectiveness.  These problems
lead to the capture of the regulator by the regulated
firm, political pressures, and the weakening of the
power of incentives that is typical in settings where
there are multiple principals (see Dixit 1996).
Standard regulatory problems are exacerbated in de-
veloping countries. To avoid corruption or creeping
expropriation, regulatory mechanisms should be de-
signed to be inflexible and leave little room for discre-
tion.5  Nevertheless, inflexibility can be costly if the
technology or the behavior of the regulated firm
changes. This is quite different from the regulator as-
sumed in the regulation literature (see, for example,
When is Franchising Desirable
5 For example, Chile has introduced legislation in elec-
tricity and telefocommunications that includes technical for-
mulas that dictate how to compute transmission and distri-
bution costs.  An alternative approach stresses simple rules,
regulators that are independent from the political authorities,
and intense public scrunity of the regulator’s actions.  Such
regulatory governance has seldom been attemped develop-
ing countries.6
Laffont and Tirole 1993), who can react to new infor-
mation and wants to find out the true costs of the regu-
lated firm. Such a regulator needs room for discretion,
something that can be achieved efficiently only under
institutional settings akin to those prevalent in more
developed economies, where regulators are indepen-
dent of political authorities and accountable to the pub-
lic, and the legal system works properly. Hence, the
balance between regulation and competition changes
in developing countries.  Mechanisms that mimic mar-
kets are more valuable when regulation is inefficient or
corruptible, the common state of affairs in the devel-
oping world.
Scale Economies
An infrastructure project is subject to increasing re-
turns to scale if the average cost is decreasing in the
number of users of the service. Many infrastructure
projects have increasing returns, which has the unfor-
tunate consequence of leading to natural monopolies;
for example: roads, electric transmission, and electric
and water distribution. By contrast, electricity genera-
tion or long distance and local telephone services (re-
cently) are not subject to significant scale economies
and can be provided under competition. When scale
economies are relevant in the market, some sort of
regulation is unavoidable.
Verifiability of Quality
When economies of scale preclude the development
of a competitive market, there still remains the choice
between a regulated private utility and a competitively
auctioned franchise. The choice depends on the feasi-
bility of verifying the quality of the assets. Thus, con-
tracts specifying maintenance requirements can be
written.
Verifiability is the main determinant of the feasibility of
limited-time concessions. Infrastructure quality is veri-
fiable if an independent observer can determine the
state of conservation of the assets. This is usually the
case if there exists a secondary market for the infra-
structure. For example, water distribution concessions
usually are indefinite, because it is very costly to verify
the state of conservation of underground assets. By
contrast, road quality can be easily assessed by third
parties. Thus, concessions for roads can be extended
for a limited time period and competition ex ante can
be introduced by making firms compete for the fran-
chise.
The verifiability of service quality is also an important
consideration in determining the way in which the ser-
vice should be provided, how it should be regulated,
and how much risk should be borne by the conces-
sionaire. If demand depends on the effort of the fran-
chise holder, there is a trade-off between incentives to
effort and shielding the concessionaire from risk and
hence reducing the risk premium. This trade-off can
be relaxed if the regulator is willing to enforce service
quality standards, as this option reduces the scope of
gains from the franchise holder’s efforts. The basic
principle is that a smaller influence of the concession-
aire on demand should be associated to less demand
risk.
Classification
Figure 1 represents the best option available for dif-
ferent kinds of infrastructure provision. In each case
the best mechanism is determined by the characteris-
tics of the infrastructure. There are three basic op-
tions: competition, creation of a market, and the peri-
odic auction of franchises.
Competition and Creation of a Market
When there are no scale economies with respect to
the relevant market, a competitive market can be cre-
ated. This is applicable, for example, to the case of
electricity generation, long distance telephone service,
or bulk water supply. 6
6Recent technological advances has made local tele-
phone services a case in which competition can be intro-
duced if interconnection with the former monopoly can be
introduced if interconnection with the former monopoly can
be enforced.  See, for example Smith 1996.7
Competition in Chile’s Long Distance Telephone
Market.    An example where there is competitive
provision of infrastructure services is the case of long
distance telephone calls in Chile, better known as the
“multicarrier.”  Since late in 1994, every local sub-
scriber can access each of several long distance carri-
ers by dialing a three-digit code. The substitution of a
competitive market for a regulated monopoly has
brought prices down by more than 40 percent and
traffic has more than doubled. Previously, the private
long distance monopoly had been thought to be regu-
lated efficiently. Not surprisingly, it claimed that scale
economies made competition unfeasible.
Competition in Electricity Generation.  Electricity
generation in Britain, Chile and several other Latin
American countries, where private parties bid to sup-
ply electricity to the central grid also illustrates how to
establish a competitive market. The coordinating
mechanism selects the lowest bids to supply the exist-
ing demand at each instant (or more practically, each
hour or half hour). In Argentina, for example, “...prices
for energy are bid rather than related to costs by a
formula.” Observed performance has been encourag-
ing. The quality of electricity supply has improved and
generation costs have fallen. Some problems remain,
especially when only a few operators dominate the
market and are able to manipulate the mechanism.
Competition between airport terminals.   A very
interesting example of the introduction of competition
is the partial privatization of the Lester B. Pearson air-
port in Toronto. Terminals 1 and 2 are owned by a
public sector entity. A private consortium holds a con-
cession for the third terminal.  The terminals compete
with each other to attract airlines, being free to set
fees for services.
Periodic Auction of a Franchise
When a competitive market is not feasible some com-
petition can be introduced by periodically auctioning
the franchise. This is what Chadwick (1859) called
competition for the field, which substitutes for com-
petition  in the field.7  The reasoning, made popular
by Demsetz (1968)  is that competition for the fran-
chise will dissipate economic rents (see also Posner
1972; for a critical assessment of Demsetz’s  work
see Williamson 1985). As Klein and Roger (1996)
stress, franchise bidding is especially appropriate “[...]
whenever investments are not tied to a particular ser-
vice area” (e.g., bus transport or airplanes). The ex-
planation is that there is less  scope for regulatory ex-
propriation when investments are mobile.
When investments are sunk and tied to a particular
service area (e.g., a road) periodic auctions can be
used only if the quality of the assets can be verified at
the end of the franchise. Given the limitations faced by
regulation, especially in developing countries, periodic
auctions limit the monopoly power and the rents of the
concessionaire more effectively than regulated utilities.
The problem is that the award of a franchise estab-
lishes a long-term relationship between the franchisee
and the regulator. Hence, the bidding process must be
designed to minimize future problems in the relation
and reduce the likelihood of opportunistic renegotia-
tions. Particular attention must be given to the weak-
nesses of the regulator and to the fears of expropria-
tion of the franchise holder.
Regulated Utility
An indefinite concession is required when the infra-
structures services cannot be franchised because the
quality of the assets cannot be verified.8  In this case
there must be direct regulation of the firm’s monopoly
power. If assets are specific, the regulatory contract
must be designed to give credible guarantees to the
firm that it will not be arbitrarily expropriated.
7Chadwick was inspired by the French experience with
competitive public works contracts dating back at least to
fortress construction under Vaubon in 1605.  For more on
infrastructure privatization in an historical perspective, see
Klein and Roger (1995).
8Even in the case of France’s water monopolies, which
are periodically auctioned, franchises rarely change hands.
Apparently, the effect of periodic auctions is to limit the ex-
ploitation of monopoly power.8
This section examines the conceptual issues that de-
termine the appropriate allocation mechanism for a
given type of infrastructure franchise. Recall that infra-
structure franchises are characterized by long-term
relations involving the franchisee, the regulator and the
public.
The general rule is that the allocation mechanism should
maximize the sum of user and franchise holder sur-
pluses.  This implies that the mechanism should maxi-
mize the present value of consumer surplus subject to
the constraint that the franchise holder makes normal
profits.9   The regulator should prevent the exploita-
tion of any monopoly power, and the most efficient
firm should be assigned the franchise in a competitive
auction. In addition, the duration of the concession
must allow the franchise holder to make a normal re-
turn on his investment. There are several open auction
mechanisms that, at least in principle, satisfy both re-
quirements, so it is necessary to have some criteria to
compare them.
An auction mechanism is a set of rules that specifies
how the winner of the auction is chosen. In standard
theoretical settings an open and competitive auction
guarantees social efficiency. This is not the case for
infrastructure franchises, where the award  consists of
a long-term contract between the State and a private
firm (a build, operate and transfer or BOT contract).
Uncertainties, risk allocation, incentive problems and
the possibility of renegotiations mean that alternative
allocation mechanisms may differ substantially in their
welfare implications.  The franchise contract (i) deter-
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mines the franchise holder’s obligations; (ii) regulates
the monopolistic exploitation of the franchise (for ex-
ample,  by fixing a maximum price for the service or
by sharing income with the government); and (iii) de-
termines how risks, profits and losses are shared
among the franchise holder, road users and taxpayers.
Franchise contracts are often difficult to design be-
cause demand forecasts are highly uncertain,  sunk
investments are large, and it is costly for the State to
switch to another supplier after the contract is awarded.
Thus, they are subject to what Oliver Williamson
(1979, 1985) has termed “the fundamental transfor-
mation,” that is, before the franchise is awarded, the
relation between firms and the State is competitive;
after the contract is awarded, it becomes a bilateral
monopoly. Because many events that may significantly
affect the venture’s profitability cannot be specified in
a contract, franchise contracts are inherently incom-
plete, and there is ample room for opportunistic be-
havior on both sides.
Toll Roads in France: Opportunistic Behavior by a
Government:  After the oil shock the French govern-
ment was reluctant to let highway tolls rise because it
wanted to control inflation. While the franchise con-
tract stipulated that private concessionaires could set
tolls at will, the government ignored it. Concession-
aires sued and lost; the court argued that there was a
1945 law which said that the government could fix
any price (see Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993,
p.117).
The rest of this section lists several rules that should
be taken into account when designing and evaluating
an auction mechanism and its associated franchise
contract. 9 When user fees are distortionary, lower revenues from
user fees increases welfare.  When user fees are not
distortionary, additional government revenue (after the fran-
chise is returned to the government or another franchise holder
pays for access to the infrastructure), reduces other
distortionary taxes.9
Information
In order to verify whether the franchise holder com-
plies with the terms of the contract, the regulator needs
information. However, given the incentives of the fran-
chise holder to provide misleading data,  the ability of
the regulator to enforce the contract should not de-
pend on information known only to the franchisee.
The franchise contract is less risky if it restricts the
possibilities of opportunistic behavior by the franchise
holder or the regulator’s use of discretionars power.
Hence, the fulfillment of the provisions of the contract
should be easily verifiable by third parties, so that dis-
putes are less likely.
Profit Caps and the Verification of Fulfillment of
Contract Provisions.   The regulator should not at-
tempt to limit the franchise holder’s profits. To do so
would require knowing the actual cost of building and
operating the franchise. It is difficult for a regulator to
verify a firm’s costs because it is in the franchise
holder’s interest to report high costs in order to lower
accounting profits. Conversely, the above principle is
consistent with the specification of quality standards in
infrastructure projects when these are easily verifiable.
For example, when an airport runway is franchised,
quality standards can be objectively set and monitored
by third parties with specialized equipment.
Simplicity
A second desirable property is that the auction mecha-
nism be simple. A cursory examination of the mecha-
nisms used to auction franchises in different countries
leads to the conclusion that this principle is often ig-
nored. The shortcoming of complex mechanisms is that
they depend on many variables, which makes them
difficult to analyze and can lead to complaints of evalu-
ator bias. Multifactor point rating systems are com-
monly used. In order to reduce the scope for evalua-
tor subjectivity, these factors should be quantifiable.
However, since the weights assigned to different fac-
tors are to some extent arbitrary, they can lead to un-
anticipated outcomes, thereby increasing uncertainty.
Furthermore, complex contracts are not transparent,
and this widens the regulator´s discretionary scope and
the franchisee’s opportunistic behavior.  These argu-
ments suggest that the choice of the winner should
depend on a single variable.
Regulators are usually tempted by complexity in an
effort to satisfy the different interests with stakes in the
franchise. For example, planners offering demand guar-
antees may link them to profit sharing between the
state and the franchise holder, thereby seeking com-
pensation for the guarantee if the returns exceed a pre-
determined limit. This makes it difficult for potential
bidders to estimate the value of the project and re-
quires sophisticated monitoring.
Another problem with complex contracts is that su-
pervision is more difficult and there may be a lack of
coherence between different provisions of the con-
tract, making renegotiations more likely. As mentioned
earlier, the problem with renegotiations is that they re-
place the ex ante competition of competitive auctions
with an ex post bilateral monopoly, in which the gov-
ernment (or worse, the public) usually ends up worse
off. Moreover, the results of the renegotiation can easily
lead to charges of corruption and discretion, which
has perverse effects on the participants in future fran-
chises. Finally, complex contracts hinder the public’s
ability to understand what has been awarded in the
auction.
El Melon Tunnel, Chile: Complex Bidding Arrange-
ments:  I 1992, the Chilean government announced a
BOT auction for the El Melon tunnel, on the Pan Ameri-
can highway. Projects costs were estimated at US$40
million. Those companies with projects that satisfied
minimum technical standards were allowed to bid in
the final stage of the auction. The scoring formula for
this stage included seven variables with different
weights: annual subsidy to or payment by the franchi-
see, toll level and structure (in itself composed of six
different tolls for various classes of vehicles), length of
the franchise, minimum income guarantee from the state,
degree of construction risk borne by bidders, score
on the basis of additional services and, least but not
last, the CPI adjustment formula. The outcome of the
auction was somewhat unexpected. The first and sec-10
ond bids offered the maximum toll and the award was
decided on the basis of the payment to the state. The
tunnel was built on time but the franchise owner has
been pressing for a renegotiation to reduce tolls in ex-
change for a lower payment to the State. This would
lead to an efficiency gain but,  at the same time, would
establish the precedent that contracts can be renego-
tiated at the franchise holder’s request.  So far, the
Chilean government has not given in to the pressure.
Risks and their Allocation
A franchise contract spreads the various risks of a
particular infrastructure project among the franchise
holder, users and taxpayers. Since the average ex post
return and risk premium asked by a franchise holder
rises with the risk he or she bears, the chosen mecha-
nism should transfer risks to the party best able  to
diversify them.10 Yet, the above principle is subject to
a major qualification: a party has fewer incentives to
be efficient when he or she does not bear a risk she
can control. For example, if the regulator insures against
cost overruns, the franchise holder  has no incentive to
control costs. Thus, controllable risks should be borne
by the party that is best able to control them. Any risk
which can not be controlled or eliminated ought to be
diversified.
Demand Risk
Demand risk arises in contexts where forecasts are
notoriously imprecise, as is the case for many types of
infrastructure projects. While most  economic activi-
ties must cope with the impredictability of market
demand, it is particularly difficult to do so when in-
vestments are  large (both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to the size of the market), indivisible, tied to a
particular location, and service at a distance is not fea-
sible. Firms have little flexibility to adapt to low de-
mand scenarios and losses can be substantial. In gen-
eral, short-term forecasts (three to five years ahead)
usually have significant errors; medium- and long-term
forecasts are almost useless. The source of forecast
errors may be both macro and microeconomic. Mac-
roeconomic risks are related to how the economy is
growing on aggregate, while microeconomic risks re-
flect local demand fluctuations.  Finally, if a substantial
part of the demand risk cannot be controlled by the
franchise holder, it should be diversified.
Toll Roads in Chile: Difficulties in Forecasting
Demand:  Figure 1 shows the increase in the number
of motor vehicles paying tolls during the past decade
in three of the main tolled roads in Chile.
11  Macro-
economic risk is reflected, for example, in the fact that
vehicle flows grew much faster during 1988 than in
10 We are assuming that firms are risk-averse in the sense
of decision theory under uncertainty.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Angosturá:   8.8 15.0 11.7 4.5 8.7 12.4 6.7   7.8   9.4
Zapata: 21.5 14.4 13.1 8.1 7.2   5.2 2.9   3.9   4.9
Lampa:   3.8 13.4 15.9 8.9 6.8 18.0 8.8 16.2 12.5
Vehicles Paying Tolls:  Growth Rate (%) Figure 1
11The rates correspond to the growth in the flow of ve-
hicles from one year to the next. For example the vehicle flow
through the Angosturá tolls in 1987 was 8.8% above that in
1986. These flows are representative, covering the three busi-
est highways near Santiago.11
1990. Microeconomic risk is apparent in most years:
the growth of vehicle flow fluctuates considerably
around the annual average from one tollbooth to an-
other. It should be stressed that, macroeconomically
speaking, the past decade has been Chile’s most stable
during this century: there have been no recessions and
GDP has grown at an average six percent per annum.
Despite this, traffic growth rates fluctuate consider-
ably.12
Orlival Train, France: Over-Optimistic Demand
Estimates:  The privately built and run Orlival under-
ground train joins Orly airport with the Paris under-
ground. It was a technical success, because construc-
tion costs were as planned and the project was com-
pleted on time. However, demand was grossly over-
estimated, which resulted in big losses (See Tirole.
1977).
Construction and Operation Costs
A different source of risk stems from uncertainty about
building and maintenance costs. This risk exists be-
cause the costs of building and maintenance generally
differ from projections. Actual costs and the diligence
of the franchise holder cannot be known directly by
the State or by users. As these costs are known and
controlled only by the franchise holder, he should as-
sume them.13
Policy Risk
Private infrastructure projects face problems of policy
induced risk.   Actions by different levels of govern-
ment may have serious effect on the profits of the fran-
chise owner. For example, governments it may build
infrastructure that competes with the franchise, it may
reduce user fees or it may raise environmental norms.
This risk should not be borne by  the franchise holder
since he cannot control it.  However, the government
may wish to retain flexibility in the long run, which may
require specifying that certain actions are allowable
under the contract. The franchise contract should be
designed so as to reduce the impact of policy changes
that cannot be anticipated.
Expropriation risk should be dealt with through ad-
equate institutional reform.  The extent of this risk de-
pends on the type of project. In cases such as elec-
tricity generation, a few countries have tried to reduce
the government’s  discretion by incorporating detailed
rules into the electric law, rules what would normally
be part of discretionary regulations. This has lowered
the risk faced by investors at the expense of a loss of
flexibility for the regulator. Yet there are cogent rea-
sons for  the government to retain flexibility in the case
of franchises such as roads.  First, is the belief that
local authorities should not be bound by the central
government. Second, changes in regional conditions
might make it desirable to add franchises that capture
part of the demand of the original franchise.
If the government does not want to lose flexibility, but
the associated level of risk precludes the firms from
obtaining finance, there are two options available;
namely to provide guarantees that will insure at least a
fraction of the returns of the franchise holder,  or to
design a franchise system that will insulate the firm from
these risks.
14  The difference between guarantees and
a change in the franchise scheme lies in how they dis-
tribute risk.
15  Risk is transferred from the franchise
holder to taxpayers in the case of guarantees, and to
users of the infrastructure project in the franchise
scheme.
12  Thus similar data for other developing countries are
likely to show as much or even more variation.
13 There could still be cost sharing for adverse selection
reasons, although in the case of auctions the case for cost
sharing is weaker. See Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 7).
15 Note that risks are reduced under a utility-type scheme,
since the infrastructure does not devolve to the state and the
owner can eventually obtain the revenue required to pay a
normal return for the project.  Whether this is the case will
depend on the difference between the firm’s discount rate
and expected demand growth.
16 Unless the Arrow-Lind (1970) conditions of indepen-
dence between the demand shocks to the project and general
shocks to the economy holds, see Klein (1996).12
The Winner’s Curse
A winner’s curse occurs when the firm winning the
franchise is the one making the most optimistic pro-
jection of some uncertain variable, generally demand
for the project or construction costs.17  In preparing
their bid for a BOT auction, each bidder projects de-
mand and construction, operation and maintenance
costs, which depend on parameters that must be esti-
mated. The bidder that obtains the most optimistic
projection will make the best offer, without necessar-
ily being the most efficient bidder. In extreme cases
this phenomenon can lead to bankruptcy the franchise
holder, or to financial difficulties that lead to contract
renegotiation. If prediction errors are smaller, so that
there is less risk, the winner’s curse becomes less rel-
evant.
Firms that are aware of the curse will scale down their
bids according to the uncertainty in their cost and de-
mand projections, and to the number of competitors
they expect.
18  Although this makes it less likely that
the franchise holder will go bankrupt, the rate of re-
turn before correcting for risk will be higher and users
will pay more. Any reduction in the prediction risk facing
franchise holders lowers not only the usual risk pre-
mium but also the premium needed to offset the
winner’s curse.19  Experience suggests that bidders in
new businesses are more prone to fall victim to the
winner’s curse.
Marketing and Maintenance
In some cases, the franchise holder can undertake
activities that increase the demand for the infrastruc-
ture or increase the efficiency of operation of the fran-
chise. A train company may provide good and reliable
service, a telephone company may develop and intro-
duce new services (e.g., call waiting) and an airport
may invest in a special radar to allow landing with low
visibility. The importance of this factor in different
projects settings will determine the appropriate auc-
tion mechanism. Little can be done to increase the
demand for a tunnel, bridge or road, provided that
certain minimum quality standards are met.20  Hence,
making the franchise holder assume demand risk serves
no purpose in this case. By contrast, in other infra-
structure projects such as public transport, telecom-
munications, water distribution and electric distribu-
tion, demand is sensitive to the quality of the service
and to marketing efforts by the franchise holder. In the
latter case the franchise holder must be given incen-
tives to perform demand enhancing activities, implying
the need to assume more risk.
The franchise holder should also be given incentives
to maintain the infrastructure project in good condi-
tion. As we mentioned before, this is feasible when
objective standards can be defined (e.g. indices of
ruggedness, in the case of airport runways) which can
be monitored with specialized equipment. As discussed
in the introduction, the planner should consider other
options, such as indefinite concession, when it is not
feasible to verify the quality of assets. In addition, the
regulator should demand guarantees to safeguard us-
ers’ interests in case the franchise holder does not meet
the required quality standards. Incentive problems are
particularly severe toward to the end of the franchise,
because the franchise holder has little to gain by spend-
ing on maintenance. It may become necessary to have
the franchise holder post guarantees that become re-
deemable at the end of the franchise if the state of the
17 For good introductions see Thaler (1988) and Milgrom
1989).
18 A bidder will choose her bid conditional on the fact
that her estimates are the most optimistic, because her bid
matters only when it wins.
19 It is worth mentioning that in sealed bids and first price
auctions (which are being used in most countries to award
franchises), the premium due to the winner’s curse is positive
even if   bidders are risk neutral; see McAfee and McMillan
(1987, p.721).
20 Penalties for blocked lanes and accidents, standards
on waiting times at tolls, etc.13
infrastructure does not meet preestablished quality stan-
dards.
Renegotiations
As mentioned in the introduction, franchise contracts
are often modified when the franchise holder runs into
financial trouble, and losses are shifted to taxpayers
or users. This is undesirable not only because of the
wealth transfers involved, but also because it creates
incentives for firms with more lobbying power to un-
derbid more efficient firms in the expectation that terms
will be renegotiated in their favor in the future
(Williamson 1985).  It could be argued that to avoid
these undesirable effects it is sufficient for the State to
stand firm and allow the franchise holder to go bank-
rupt. However, this assumes that the State is immune
to pressures from interest groups, which is generally
not the case, especially in developing countries. There-
fore, the auction mechanism should discourage
lowballing in the expectation of opportunistic renego-
tiation of the contract and place constraints on the
outcomes of renegotiations that do occur.
Renegotiation and Government Bailouts for Un-
successful Projects.  France awarded four private
road concessions in the early 1970s. After the oil
shocks three of them went bankrupt and were taken
over by the government. Twelve concessions were
awarded Spain before 1973. In the case of several of
them building costs ended up being 4 to 5 times higher
than expected, and traffic one-third of what was origi-
nally projected. Three firms went bankrupt, two oth-
ers were absorbed by stronger franchise holders which
were granted toll increases and term extensions.  In
Mexico, virtually all the highway concessions were
renegotiated after cost overruns and low revenues, with
a (declared) cost to the government of US$2 billion.
This cost does not include the cost to users in term
extensions, since in several cases the terms more than
doubled. Apparently one of the causes of the cost
overruns was that the companies made their profits by
inflating construction costs, syphoning funds through
the building companies and letting the operating com-
panies go bankrupt.
Flexibility
While it is desirable to prevent opportunistic renego-
tiations, there are circumstances in which social wel-
fare increases if the terms of the contract can be modi-
fied after the franchise is allocated. For example it might
be desirable to increase the service capacity of the
infrastructure before the end of the franchise period.
In other cases user fees may turn out to have been set
too high (recall that concessions may last for more
than twenty years) or demand may increase and a
higher user fee may be required to deal with excess
demand.  There can be large inefficiencies if the con-
tract specifications cannot be changed.
In such cases, two options are open to the planner.
One it to renegotiate the original contract, but this car-
ries with it all the problems of bargaining in a bilateral
monopoly situation.  The second option is to cancel
the concession and pay a fair compensation for the
profits foregone by the franchise holder.  The problem
with the second option is that the fair compensation is
the expected present value of future profits had the
concession continued on the original terms.  Often this
figure cannot be deduced from any accounting data
and is highly subjective, making endless disputes a likely
outcome.
Toll Roads in Argentina: Inadequate Provisions for
Renegotiation.  An example of a blatantly incomplete
contract, should renegotiations take place, are toll road
contracts in Argentina. They state that “[...] in case of
a substantial and sustainable increase in traffic volume,
larger than initially estimated, the concessionaire and
the government may conceive a plan to improve the
levels of service.”
Airport Concessions in Argentina: Compensation
Disputes.  In Argentina, the government wants to
refranchise airports. In order to do this, it must com-
pensate current franchise holders. The former eco-
nomics minister, Domingo Cavallo, has claimed pub-
licly that some government employees  have written a
decree that provides for a compensation of US$400
million, while the fair compensation is of the order of
US$40 million (El Mercurio 1997). 14
The only way of preserving flexibility without giving
the State room for discretion is by providing a method
for determining a fair compensation that is easy to as-
sess, unobjectionable, and close to foregone profits.
White Elephants and Government Guarantees
White elephants are usually built because governments
give in to small but well-organized pressure groups.
One of the major advantages of the private supply of
infrastructure is that the likelihood that these pressures
will be effective is smaller since the franchisee stands
to lose money if the project turns out to be a white
elephant. This filtering ability is reduced if the govern-
ment provides income or debt guarantees to the fran-
chise owner.  Hence, guarantees should be avoided if
possible. The only circumstance when guarantees may
be justified is when early starters of an activity gener-
ate learning externalities that benefit followers.21 
The Lonquimay Tunnel in Chile: Ineffective Project
Screening.   In the mid-1940s, Chile and Argentina
decided to begin an early process of integration.  As
part of this process, a railway link was conceived be-
tween Concepción and a port in Argentina.  The Chil-
eans built the Railway line up to their boundary with
Argentina, including the Lonquimay tunnel (which is
still the longest tunnel in Latin America), and rail sta-
tions along the way.  Unfortunately, the Argentinian
line was never built, so the project was never put to its
intended use.  A private firm would not have begun the
Chilean part of the project until assured that the Ar-
gentine project was underway.
San Jose Lagoon Toll Bridge: Poor Incentives for
Project Screening.  The San Jose Lagoon Toll Bridge
was built to relieve congestion in the San Juan region
in Puerto Rico. The government assumed most of the
commercial risk by guaranteeing to buy the project
back at the concessionaires request if actual traffic fell
short of 80 percent of projections in the first three
years and of 100 percent of projections after nine
years. In that event, the government will pay the con-
cessionaire all project costs plus 13 percent. Under
this scheme the firm has no incentives to screen the
project for quality. This is an example of a badly de-
signed guarantee scheme.
21 For a detailed discussion of  the role of government
guarantees for private infrastructure  projects, see Engel,
Fisher and Galetovic (EFG) (1997b).15
Common mechanisms used to award infrastructure
franchises are  based on a fixed franchise term, which
must be long enough to recover investment costs. 22 A
common type of fixed-term mechanism is one in which
the regulator fixes the term and the franchise is awarded
to the firm that offers to charge the lowest user fee.23 
Alternatively, the regulator sets the term and the fran-
chise is adjudicated to the bidder that gets the highest
score in a formula that weighs technical and economic
aspects.24 
The main defect of fixed-term mechanisms is that they
make the franchise holder assume a large fraction of
the demand risk. To see why this is so, note that a
franchise may loose money if the term is too short. In
the long run, user fees might be enough to pay the
investment costs, but the franchise ends before then.
Of course, if the auction is competitive, for any given
term firms will offer bids such that the duration of the
franchise will be just about right to make normal prof-
its on average; bad states where the term is too short
will be compensated by good states in which demand
is larger than expected so revenues over the duration
of the franchise are much larger than the investment.
Since returns are uncertain, franchise holders will ask
for a risk premium.  Thus, on average, profits made in
good states more than compensate for losses in bad
states. This risk premium is paid by users.
High risk causes several problems which are particu-
larly relevant when initial investments are large. First,
potential bidders usually demand debt or minimum in-
come guarantees. Second, they increase the likelihood
that the best bid will be made by the firm that is most
optimistic in predicting future demand for the infra-
structure. This occurs because optimistic estimates lead
to aggressive bids when the term of the franchise is
fixed. Third, fixed-term mechanisms encourage under-
bidding by firms that are efficient renegotiators. Fourth,
if franchises are allocated to the bidder offering the
lowest user charge, the regulator loses the ability to fix
user fees based on efficiency criteria so as to correct
externalities. This may be of great importance in
projects such as highways.
Finally, fixed-term franchises make contracts inflex-
ible when modifications to the original terms are re-
quired to increase social welfare. The reason is that it
is hard to agree on  compensation, which is the ex-
pected income foregone by the franchise holder  over
the remainder of the franchise had the terms of the
franchise remained the same. This compensation can-
not be determined from any accounting data and  must
be decided in a bilateral negotiation. On the one hand,
there are clear incentives for the franchise holder to
exaggerate projections future income. On the other
hand,  giving considerable power to the regulator to
set the compensation opens the door for the use of
discretion and the opportunistic taking of the franchise.
The same argument applies to modifications of  user
fees. Even if they prove to be totally inadequate, it is
very difficult to determine a fair compensation  if in-
come falls, or a sharing scheme if revenues rise.
Fixed-term mechanisms have one important virtue: they
give powerful incentives for the franchise holder to in-
Fixed-Term Auction Mechanisms
22 Some mechanisms, for example those used in private
highways in Mexico, gave the franchise holder the option of
extending the franchise for an additional fixed term at the end
of the original one.  It is easy to show that our comments
about fixed term franchises apply to this case as well (see
EFG 1997c).
23 In these cases there are two bids: a first stage techni-
cal bid in which participants have to satisfy technical re-
quirements and if they pass, they are allowed to participate
in the economic auctions.
24 In a version used in some highway franchises in
Mexico, the toll (user fee) was set by the regulator and the
franchise was awarded to the firm asking for the shortest
term.16
crease demand for the services provided by the infra-
structure because most of the returns  to those efforts
accrue to him. For some types of projects, where de-
mand is responsive to the actions of the operator, this
feature may to some extent compensate its disadvan-
tages.  However, in projects where revenue is unre-
sponsive to the actions of the operator, the inflexibility
and risky nature of fixed-term auctions makes them
unattractive.17
This section presents a new mechanism to auction in-
frastructure franchises with the distinctive feature of
having a flexible franchise term that adjusts automati-
cally to demand realizations. The mechanism, in its pure
form, is the following:
• The regulator fixes the user fee that the franchise
holder can charge
• The franchise is won by the firm that asks for the
least preent value of user fee revenue (PVR).
• The franchise ends when the present value of user
fee revenue is equal to the franchise holder’s bid.27
 The rate used to discount user fee revenue is part of
the franchise contract and is fixed by the regulator
before the auction takes place; it should be a good
estimate of the rate faced by franchise holders and
may vary in a predetermined way (e.g., LIBOR plus a
fixed risk premium).
For example, consider an auction in which two firms
take part. The first estimates its costs at $100 million,
and asks for a PVR equal to $112 million, whereas
the second estimates costs at $99 million and asks for
$110 million. The second firm wins the franchise and
operates it until the present value of user fee revenue
is equal to $110 million. As soon as this amount is
collected, the franchise ends. The remainder of this
section analyzes LPVR auctions and compares them
to fixed-term franchises.
Reduction of Demand Risk
By making the length of the franchise responsive to
demand, LPVR auctions significantly reduce the de-
mand risk borne by the franchise holder, particularly
when compared with the risk faced under fixed-term
auctions. To see this, note that when the term is fixed
there are states when the franchise is profitable in the
long run, but the franchise holder loses money just be-
cause the franchise term is “too short.”  In those cases
a term extension would have enabled the franchise
holder to make a normal profit. An LPVR auction uses
this fact to reduce the risk borne by the franchise holder.
The franchise term automatically lengthens when de-
mand grows slower than projected, and shortens when
it grows faster.  Since franchise owners receive (and
users pay) similar amounts in good and bad states with
LPVR auctions, the risk premium required by the fran-
chise holder is smaller, and users pay less in expected
value over the life of the franchise.
An additional advantage of  LPVR auctions is that it is
less likely that the firm making the most optimistic de-
mand estimate will be a victim of the winner’s curse.
The reason is that bids become more cost-oriented
than with a fixed-term auction. In addition, uncertainty
about revenue decreases, so that the impact of de-
mand forecast errors is smaller.  An optimistic demand
estimate translates into low user fees or short conces-
sion terms. In contrast, with LPVR franchises, firms
fix their revenues in present value when they choose
their bids; winning the auction by being too optimistic
means that the franchise will end earlier than expected,
not that the franchise owner will receive less revenue.26 
Hence, bids depend more on the quality of the invest-
ment and on estimates of maintenance and operation
cost than on demand estimates, so it becomes more
A New Auction Mechanism
25 Since the operator may lie, the government needs an
independent means of checking the actual use of the infra-
structure.
26 Being more optimistic leads to a somewhat more ag-
gressive bid because estimated operation costs are lower.
Yet, when operation costs are small relative to the invest-
ment cost, this effect is an order of magnitude smaller than
the effect of uncertain demand in the case of fixed-term auc-
tions.18
likely that the most efficient firm will win the auction. A
smaller winner’s curse provides another reason for
expecting that bidders will ask for a smaller expected
present value equivalent over the life of the franchise.
Benefits of Switching to LPVR Auctions.  In EFG
(1996) we estimate that in the case of toll roads in
Chile, the gain stemming solely from the reduction in
risk is, on average, 33 percent of the cost of the project
or US$800 million.28 
LPVR auctions reduce the risk borne by the franchise
holder but they do not eliminate it completely. The fran-
chise holder assumes construction risks, as well as fixed
maintenance and operating cost risks. Nevertheless,
as we have already mentioned earlier, it is efficient to
assign to the franchise owner those costs that are un-
verifiable and under his control. Even if fixed opera-
tion and maintenance costs were known with certainty,
their present value over the life of the franchise varies
with the term. This is desirable, since it creates incen-
tives for the franchise holder to perform activities that
raise demand for the services provided by the infra-
structure project. Finally, even an indefinite franchise
may not be enough to pay for the cost of building the
franchise, that is, the project may turn out to be a white
elephant. As we have discussed earlier, one of the main
reasons for the private provision of infrastructure is
the screening of white elephants. There is no social
gain in blunting this instrument by insuring against white
elephants. In other words, an efficient auction mecha-
nism such as an LPVR should let the franchise holder
bear this risk.
Renegotiations, Discretion and Modifications of
the Contract
The second advantage of LPVR franchises stems from
the fact that the firm’s bid reveals the revenues re-
quired  to make a normal profit.28  Hence a fair com-
pensation for early termination of the lease is the sum
still remaining to be collected.29  Several consequences
follow from this. First, suppose that before the fran-
chise ends the regulator decides that increased de-
mand requires enlarging the infrastructure. Under a
fixed-term auction, there is no easy way to assign the
costs of the expansion and negotiations take place
under conditions of bilateral monopoly, precisely the
situation that competitive auctions try to avoid.  Alter-
natively, the lease is terminated, but there is no easy
way to determine a fair compensation.  Under an LPVR
franchise, the regulator pays the unambiguous fair com-
pensation.
Second, the existence of an observable fair compen-
sation makes it more difficult to expropriate the fran-
chise (or even to use regulations to impose a “creep-
ing expropriation”).  When the term is fixed, it is diffi-
cult to estimate the wealth loss incurred by the fran-
chise holder, so it is easier for the government to argue
that the compensation offered implies no loss or that
the franchise holder has made “excessive” profits.
Under an LPVR auction the franchise holder’s bid is a
clear and observable benchmark that can be used to
challenge any attempt at opportunistic expropriation.
Third, in the event that the franchise holder wants to
renegotiate, say, because of cost overruns, there is an
observable standard against which overly generous
compensations can be compared. This helps to stiffen
the backbone of the regulator against pressures from
the franchise holder. Fourth, for the same reason,
LPVR auctions discourage underbidding by opportu-
nistic firms.
Note also that the common forms of renegotiation are
ineffective under LPVR.  Raising user fees has the ef-
fect of shortening the lease, but does not increase the
franchise holder’s revenues.  Lease extensions have
27 This is an underestimate of the true advantages of the
LPVR auctions in this case, because we have omitted the
more intangible gains due to the better renegotiation charac-
teristics and those arising from the added flexibility in capac-
ity and toll setting.
28 This assumes that the auction is competitive.
29 Of course, this is an upper bound, since the franchise
holder saves on operation and maintenance costs if the fran-
chise is terminated ahead of time. A typical franchise contract
would specify how this upper bound should be reduced de-
pending on the number of years outstanding.19
no meaning in the context of LPVR auctions since, by
definition, the term is variable. Thus, any attempt by
the franchise holder at renegotiating is likely to take
the form of asking for an increase in revenue. The
welfare loss of users affected by a renegotiation of this
kind is easy to grasp, thus increasing the likelihood
that those affected will pressure the regulator to resist
the attempts.
Optimality Properties
LPVR franchises enable the regulator to separate the
process of  setting user fees from the process of allo-
cating the franchise. Hence, LPVR auctions make it
much easier to change user fees if they prove to be
inadequate.  If operation and maintenance costs are
small relative to sunk initial investment, user fees can
be adjusted optimally to reflect demand conditions,
since the effect of changes in user fees are reflected in
changes in the length of the franchise and the effects
on profits is small.30 
In fact, it is easy to show that an infrastructure project
franchised under LPVR, which is operating at capac-
ity at peak time, can achieve a first best if the user fees
are set at the optimal level (EFG 1997c, for a formal
proof). For example, suppose there are two possible
demand scenarios, each with a peak period with fully
utilized capacity (but different demands),  and an
uncongested period. If user fees are set at marginal
cost at off peak times, and at the optimal level at peak
time and if the user fees can finance the project in both
cases we have a first best.31 
LPVR Contracts and Government Guarantees
By reducing demand risks, LPVR contracts also con-
siderably reduce the demand for government guaran-
tees. However, as discussed previously, if a project
generates important learning externalities that benefit
followers, some  minimum income guarantee may be
warranted.32   This can be done  by guaranteeing a
fraction of the present value of revenue asked (say, 80
percent). One advantage is that, in this way, guaran-
tees are chosen by the franchise holder and competed
for in the auction.33 
Variable Term and Financing
It has been suggested (see, e.g., Klein 1997) that one
possible disadvantage of LPVR franchises is that vari-
able-term debt contracts are not very common, so
that financing could be more expensive. In our judge-
ment this is not so. In what follows we show that vari-
able-term franchises are at least as attractive for debt
holders as fixed-term franchises, and considerably
more attractive for equity holders.
Consider the case of two identical infrastructure
projects that cost $1,500 to build and involve no ad-
ditional operating costs. Demand may be high (200
units each year) or low (100 units each year); both
demand scenarios are equally likely. The regulator fixes
user fees at $1 per unit. For simplicity, assume that the
discount rate is 0.
In the first project the term of the franchise is fixed and
independent of demand realizations; the franchise is
allocated to the firm asking the shortest term. If firms
are risk neutral, the winner would offer a term of 10
years.34  Yet, since firms are risk averse, they will ask
for a longer term, say 12 years. In that case, if de-
mand is high, the franchise holder makes a profit of
$900. By contrast, if demand is low he loses $300.
30 Note, however, that user fees should not be fixed so
low that the franchise never achieves the LPVR revenue.
31 In EFG (1997c) we show that LPVR auctions are opti-
mal subject to the self-financing constraint.
32 Even with an LPVR concession, the franchise holder
may lose money if demand is so low that a very long term is
not enough to recoup the initial investment and cover oper-
ating costs.
33 Since there may be collusion among auction partici-
pants, the government should set an upper bound to the
guarantee.
34 The reason is that ($200*10)/2+($100*10)/2 = $1,500.20
The second project is auctioned by LPVR. Regard-
less of risk aversion, the winner will ask for $1,500,
because this sum covers costs in both cases of nature.
No matter what demand is, with an LPVR auction
economic profits are zero.
Let us now look at matters from the perspective of
lenders. For the sake of simplicity, assume that they
are willing to lend only if the probability of default is
zero. Under a fixed-term franchise revenues will be at
least $1,200.  Thus, debt-holders will lend more than
$1,200 only if a guarantee is given. By contrast, under
an LPVR auction financiers would be willing to lend
up to the full amount needed to construct the project,
that is, $1,500.
As long as debt finances less than $1,200, lenders can
be sure that they will receive at least $100 per year
under both mechanisms. In both cases, the possibility
of prepayment can be considered if the optimistic de-
mand scenario occurs. Thus, how safe a loan is does
not depend on the mechanism chosen. The reason is
quite general. Lenders are first in line among claim
holders, so they receive all cash flows in cases where
demand is low. And these flows do not depend on the
auction mechanism that is used.
Assume now that debt finances more than $1,200.
Under fixed-term franchises this will be feasible only if
the government provides a guarantee. By contrast, with
an LPVR scheme a guarantee would be needed to
ensure a given timing of payments but not the total
amount, which is certain. Even if guarantees are equally
attractive under both mechanisms, the advantages of
LPVR auction from the social point of view are evi-
dent.
Note, moreover, that this example also serves to show
that shareholders assume much less risk under an
LPVR auction. For example, if 80 percent of the
project is financed with debt, and 20percent with eq-
uity, and, if the government guarantees the debt, eq-
uity holders lose all their investment when demand is
low. By contrast, they do not lose anything under an
LPVR auction. Admittedly, equity holders do not know
when they are going to recoup their investment, but
this risk is minor compared with the possibility of los-
ing the investment.
The above reasoning is not only theoretical, as the fol-
lowing examples show.
The Queen Elisabeth II Bridge: A Variable-Term
Franchise.  In 1987, the British government awarded
a concession for the construction and operation of the
Queen Elisabeth  II Bridge that crosses the Thames
near Dartford in Essex county. The winning consor-
tium of Kleinwort Benson, Trafalgar House, Bank of
America and Prudential Assurance was chosen in part
because of its innovative financing package (which
would also be suitable to finance a project awarded
with an LPVR auction). While the demand for bridge
crossings was uncertain, there was little doubt that the
project was financially sound provided that the fran-
chise term was long enough. Thus, the concession will
end after 20 years or as soon as toll income is enough
to repay principal and interest, whichever happens first.
The project relied entirely on debt financing. The four
members of the cosortium formed the Dartford River
Ltd., with nominal capital of £1,000, which was lent
£190 million. Dartford River Ltd. pays no dividends
and all its net cash flow is used to pay back debt and
interest. The bridge was inaugurated in October 1991
and it is estimated that it will return to the government
in 1999, after only eight years.
The Second Severn Crossing: “Bankability” of
Variable-Term Franchises.  In 1992, construction
work started on the Second Severn Crossing,  the
second bridge on the Severn estuary at the English
Stones site. The amount of revenue that the franchise
holder is allowed to collect is fixed for the entire pe-
riod of 30 years, so that the concession ends as soon
as the sum is collected. According to Jones et al.
(1996): “If the contingent concession length had not
been allowed, extra risk would have been transferred
to the project’s cost of capital, and banks may have
been less prepared to take on financing risks.” This
£300 million project was finished under budget in June
of 1996, and is now operating successfully.21
There are several lessons to be learned from the pre-
vious reasoning and examples. First, guarantees are
less important when the franchise is allocated with an
LPVR auction. Second, even if the government pledges
the same guarantee under both mechanisms, its actual
outlays will be smaller with an LPVR auction because
guarantees will be exercised less often. This point is
important because it is highly likely that the guarantees
provided by the State will come into effect in
recessionary periods, thereby accentuating the fiscal
problems that characterize economic downturns. Third,
fixed-term and LPVR auctions are identical in terms
of the flows they generate for paying off the contract
debt; it is not true that the variable term of the LPVR
auction means that loan repayments will be less cer-
tain. Finally, equity holders assume much less risk with
an LPVR auction, and this translates into a lower risk
premium, less frequent undesirable renegotiations and
lower payments by users.
Does Term Extension Help?
A second limitation that has been suggested for LPVR
auctions (see, e.g., Klein 1997), is that since infra-
structure projects in developing countries are dis-
counted at rates between 10 percent and 15 percent,
the additional income obtained by the franchise holder
when the term of the franchise is extended is of little
use.35 
There are two reasons why the above argument is not
valid. First, discount rates depend on risk, the more
risk the higher the discount rate. High “typical” dis-
count rates are observed in projects where the term is
fixed, thus risk is also high. For this reason, under an
LPVR auction “typical” discount rates should be
lower. Second, in most infrastructure projects demand
grows over time at a rate similar to that of GDP, and
risk free rates tend to be similar to GDP growth rates.
That being the case, an extension of the term should
increase the present discounted value of a project by
approximately the same percentage.
Flexible Term and Maintenance Costs
It is clear that LPVR reduces demand uncertainty, but
could it increases maintenance cost uncertainty which,
in turn, might revert our previous results? First, note
that average maintenance costs per vehicle must be
lower than tolls, or the road would not have been built
by private firms. Hence, uncertainty about maintenance
costs will in general be less important than uncertainty
about demand for the road.  A complete answer to the
question of whether the existence of uncertainty about
maintenance costs will reduce the advantages of LPVR
depends on the type of maintenance costs.
If costs are proportional to the number of cars that
use the road, then bidders care only about net rev-
enue per car (toll - maintenance cost per car) and it
can be easily shown that all our propositions compar-
ing the advantages of LVPR over fixed-term franchises
continue to hold.
Suppose that maintenance costs are a fixed amount
per period, depending on weathering effects, for in-
stance. Under a fixed-term, maintenance costs are
known beforehand, while there is uncertainty about
the magnitude of these costs under LPVR.  However,
we have shown in previous work that the effect is of
second order, and that this effect favors LVPR in the
sense of raising social welfare as compared to a fixed-
term franchise (EFG 1995).  The intuition is simple:
with the same toll, the lower demand risk faced by the
franchise holder leads to a shorter concession term on
average, and, thus, to lower expected maintenance
costs. Since the franchise ends sooner on average,
tolls fall earlier to a level which is enough to cover
maintenance costs under  an LPVR auction and have
higher welfare than under a fixed-term franchise.
The last possibility is that the quality of construction is
endogenous and that maintenance costs depend on
construction quality. There are two effects that make
the comparison more difficult than in the previous situ-
ations. Uncertainty about the duration of the conces-
sion under LVPR and hence uncertainty about main-
tenance costs will lead to a risk averse design that
35 Remember that infrastructure franchises typically last
between 10 and 30 years.22
tends to have lower maintenance costs.  However, a
fixed-term concession will have on average a longer
term, so the franchise holder will build for a longer
term.  These two effects go in opposite directions,
so that is not clear whether maintenance cost uncer-
tainty reduces the benefits of LVPR.
Incentives for Efficient Marketing
A real limitation of LPVR franchises is that incentives
to market efficiently are smaller than when the term
is fixed (EGF 1997c for a formal proof).   The rea-
son is that with LPVR mechanisms, any marketing
effort which translates into higher demand shortens
the term of the franchise, so that profits increase less
than in the case where the term of the franchise is
fixed. This implies that under LPVR auctions fran-
chise holders have fewer incentives to invest in de-
mand-increasing features. For this reason, an LPVR
auction needs to be complemented with institutions that
determine and enforce minimum quality standards to be
met by franchise holders (see Tirole 1997). On this ba-
sis we do not recommend a pure LPVR auction for
infrastructure projects in which demand is highly respon-
sive to the activities of this franchise owners and where
minimum standards are not sufficient to enforce ad-
equate service.
There are additional means to enhancing marketing ef-
forts. First, as suggested in Tirole (1997), a monetary
reward that is larger the sooner the franchise ends  may
provide additional incentives for efficient management.
Second, in some cases unbundling may be used to sepa-
rate those parts of the business where there is little use
for performance incentives from those parts in which
they are  important. This is the topic of the next sec-
tion.36
36 Another way of increasing the marketing effort is by
lowering the discount rate, which makes shorter franchises
more attractive, yet might create other distortions.23
It was argued in the previous section that LPVR auc-
tions solve many of the  problems created by fixed-
term franchises. However, they do not provide strong
incentives to invest in activities that increase demand
by enhancing the quality of service. This is not a seri-
ous limitation in projects  where demand depends little
on the concessionaire’s efforts (e.g., roads, tunnels or
bridges) and where verifying minimum quality stan-
dards is easy. But in other types of franchises like ports,
airports, water reservoirs or underground parking
places, demand is sensitive to quality, and standards
of service are difficult to design and enforce. More-
over, there may be many different types of services
and new ones may be offered to increase demand. In
those cases LPVR schemes may be inappropriate. In
this section we argue that the scope of LPVR, auc-
tions can be considerably widened if projects are un-
bundled into two components: a construction conces-
sion, auctioned under LPVR and an operating fran-
chise adjudicated by a mechanism that provides high
incentives to raise demand for the services of the project
(either a fixed-term franchise or, whenever possible,
competitive operators). Throughout this section we
assume that  the quality and state of conservation of
assets can be easily verified.
Unbundling an Airport:  Before an airport can op-
erate, large investments  are needed in runways, ter-
minals, storage areas, and so on.  Investments in run-
ways are sunk and objective quality standards can be
set  and verified with specialized equipment. An LPVR
auction is appropriate for the right to build runways
because demand for the runway is independent of the
effort of the franchise holder (provided that appropri-
ate security standards are  met). The revenues of the
LPVR operator would come from landing fees.  How-
ever, demand for airport services is sensitive to their
quality since it depends on the availability of gates,
efficiency in the handling of baggage and cargo, etc.  If
Unbundling: Designing Appropriate Incentives
traffic is sufficiently large, more than one terminal will
be necessary. The regulator can then sell the land to
build terminals, and let different terminals compete  and
set prices for their services. No further regulation is
needed. If traffic is small, so  that only one terminal is
needed, the right to build and operate it can be allo-
cated in a fixed-term franchise. The runway can still
be allocated with an LPVR auction.
Unbundling: Principles
When a project consists of several distinct businesses,
it is  better to manage each division as an independent
profit center, unless economies of scope are impor-
tant. Unbundling makes it possible to give each divi-
sion appropriate incentives.  In many infrastructure
projects (e.g., airports, reservoirs, ports or under-
ground parking lots) demand-enhancing activities are
useful only in some segments. For example, seaport
activity depends on the speed and diligence with which
ships are unloaded. Thus, the franchise holder, who
has partial control over demand, should face some
demand risk. By contrast, provided that jetties, pro-
tection from waves or quays meet adequate construc-
tion standards, demand for port services  depends little
on actions taken by the franchise holder. There is noth-
ing to be gained by making the franchise holder as-
sume the risk that income will not be enough to cover
investment outlays because the concession has a fixed
duration; risk will only increase the required risk pre-
mium and the cost of the infrastructure.
The preceding discussion suggests that infrastructure
projects can be franchised according to the following
principles:
• Segments where the franchise holder’s effort has
little or no effect on demand and initial investments
are large should be franchised using an LPVR auc-
tion.24
• Segments where demand-increasing activities are
important should be competitive if feasible, other-
wise franchised with a fixed-term auction.
Thus unbundling enables the regulator to combine the
flexibility and better risk distribution of an LPVR auc-
tion with the incentives resulting from competition or
fixed-term franchises. In those segments that are fran-
chised with an LPVR auction firms minimize costs  be-
cause cost overruns are not covered by the regulator.
But the franchise holder faces a lower demand risk
since he will eventually receive the desired revenue
income (in present value). Moreover, the scheme still
retains the property of screening for white elephants
since that risk is not covered by the regulator and  the
flexibility that characterized LPVR auctions survive.
Consider now the operation of those segments where
the franchise holder’s effort affects demand. When-
ever competition can be established among operators,
indefinite leases are appropriate. User fees and qual-
ity will be determined by competition without the need
for regulatory intervention.  When there is only one
possible operator for the project, it is convenient to
offer fixed-term operating franchises.  Prospective fran-
chise holders bid the user fee they would be willing to
accept in order to operate the infrastructure project.
The lowest bid wins the franchise. The total cost to a
user is the sum of the fixed amount going to the seg-
ment franchised with an LPVR  scheme and the user
fee asked by the fixed-term franchise holder. Fixed-
term leases provide the high power incentives for ac-
tions that increase demand for the infrastructure project,
since at the margin, the operator is willing to spend a
dollar in costs that increase demand by more than a
dollar in present value during the remainder of the fran-
chise. For example, the operator may invest in more
efficient electronic tolling systems or better luggage
transport systems at an airport.
Fixed-term leases retain their disadvantages, but since
the sunk investment that the operator must incur is
smaller when the project is unbundled, risk premiums
fall and the various problems of fixed-term leases are
also smaller. The desire to renegotiate the original con-
tract exists, but the amounts at stake and the political
power of the operator are substantially diminished. The
contract is still inflexible but the consequences of in-
flexibility are less serious, because even though a fair
compensation cannot be easily calculated, the amounts
being considered are also smaller.  If user fees are set
too high, the regulator can lower the part of the total
user fee received by the builder, without harming him
(at least if the user fee assigned to the builder does not
fall so much that the builder is never repaid) while in-
creasing the demand faced by the operator, who still
receives the same user fee. If the user fees are set too
low, the builder will also be indifferent, but the opera-
tor will oppose a measure that reduces the demand it
faces. Nevertheless, since the amounts at stake are
lower, it should be easier to make an arrangement that
compensates the operator, even though the renegotia-
tion process may be biased towards the operator.
Implementation
We propose the following guidelines for the imple-
mentation of an unbundled privatization scheme:
• Determine the segments where competition is fea-
sible. In those establish equal access to all firms that
are interested.
• Determine minimum verifiable quality standards.
• Auction those segments where investment costs
are large and demand is unresponsive to the franchise
holder’s effort using an LPVR scheme with a base
“infrastructure fee” set by the regulator based on wel-
fare considerations.
• In those segments where demand is responsive to
the franchise holder’s effort, if possible, establish com-
petition in operations. Alternatively, auction a fixed-
term maximum “service fee” franchise.37 
37 As long as the franchise can be auctioned on the basis
of one variable.  Otherwise, the planner must design a scor-
ing function that weights the prices of the different services.25
• If the LPVR construction franchise ends before
the operations contract, the total infrastructure fee is
set to zero and users continue paying the service fee.38
 If the operation franchise ends before the LPVR fran-
chise, the operation infrastructure project is reauctioned
under a second fixed-term operating franchise.39
38 This assumes that no major repair or improvement of
the basic infrastructure is needed.
39 This second stage operation franchise should include
payment for the residual value of any investments made by
the first operator, to ensure that remains interest in their main-
tenance close to the end of the franchise.26
The experience with private infrastructure franchises
has been mixed. In some cases, such as the provision
of new roads in Mexico, the results have been disap-
pointing. Moreover, regulators in developing countries
faces various handicaps that imply that methods that
are easily applicable in developed countries cannot be
applied there.  For example, the ability of the regula-
tor to defend the interest of the public against the pres-
sures of lobbies representing private infrastructure fran-
chises, can be extremely poor. Hence franchise con-
tracts must be carefully designed to retain flexibility
under the changing conditions in developing countries
while leaving no space for discretion on the part of the
regulator.  In this paper, we have presented a mecha-
nism to auction infrastructure franchises which, we
believe, represents a significant improvement over pre-
vious systems when the projects have high initial sunk
costs and demand is unresponsive to effort by the fran-
chise holder.
LPVR auctions suffer from a trade-off between de-
mand risk and incentives. This scheme eliminates much
of the undesirable demand risk borne by the franchise
holder. At the same time, however it generates insuffi-
cient incentives to provide services of good quality
and to invest in socially valuable marketing efforts. As
Tirole (1997) has stressed, this suggests that LPVR
franchises should be complemented with other regu-
latory innovations, such as independent third parties
whose job is to verify both the quality of the infra-
structure and service, and of commensurate fines for
noncompliance. Since fixed-term and LPVR auctions
represent the opposite extremes in terms of incentives,
risk and flexibility, it seems that a method that com-
bines the best features of each may be appropriate in
cases where LPVR auctions are unattractive because
demand is highly responsive to the actions of the op-
erator.  In these cases we propose unbundling financ-
ing and construction from the operation of the project.
Under the unbundled scheme, building of the basic
infrastructure proceeds along LPVR lines, with the
builder receiving predetermined user fees (“infrastruc-
ture fees”) for the different services of the project until
the present value of the sum asked by the construction
firm is reached.  Operations are franchised to a differ-
ent firm under a fixed-term franchise, where firms com-
pete on the basis of the lowest user fee for service
(“service fees”). Normally the operation franchise is
also responsible for the maintenance of the project.
Under this scheme, the building firm faces low risk
and the contract is flexible.  The operating contract is
inflexible, but as the investment of the operating firm is
much smaller and can be incurred over time, uncer-
tainty matters less.  Moreover, the operating company
has powerful incentives to increase demand for the
infrastructure project.
Conclusion27
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